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Abstract:
Eco-labeling of services has become increasingly common, yet little empirical evidence exists concerning its
eﬀectiveness. We address this gap in the literature by analyzing a highly visible eco-label, the American College and University Presidents’ Climate Commitment (ACUPCC), in the sector of higher education. We match
information about the ACUPCC to the US Department of Education IPEDS database to examine the impact
of signing on student applications, admissions, and enrollment. We mainly utilize a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
approach to identify the eﬀects of interest but conﬁrm results with an interrupted time series model. We ﬁnd
that signing the ACUPCC increases applications and admitted students by 2.5–3.5%. However, the evidence
regarding enrollment is weaker with only some speciﬁcations ﬁnding increases of around 1–2%. Overall, there
is considerable heterogeneity across sectors and selectivity of the institutions. These results show that, at the
minimum, voluntary and information-based approaches (VIBAs) for services can be eﬀective in generating
visibility and inﬂuencing less-costly consumer behavior.
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1

Introduction

Examples of eco-labeled goods and services are becoming more and more common in the marketplace. This
practice is typically considered to be an information provision program, in which the label conveys the environmental beneﬁts of the product. In contrast to the traditional approaches to environmental regulation that
set mandatory standards or attempt to price the externality, eco-labeling is a voluntary and information-based
approach (VIBA) (Bjorner, Hansen, & Russell, 2004; Kotchen, 2013; Segerson, 2013 ). Such voluntary programs
require some commitment to improve environmental performance beyond those required by existing environmental regulations, and continue to grow in popularity, with hundreds of voluntary programs in eﬀect
around the world (Morgenstern and Pizer 2007 ). Theoretical work on the topic has shown that the provision
of such information can positively impact the environmental behavior of individuals (Kennedy, Laplante &
Maxwell, 1994; Petrakis, Sartzetakis & Xepapadeas, 2005 ) and even reduce the required environmental tax rate
(Sartzetakis, Xepapadeas, and Petrakis 2012 ). Likewise, some have argued that market forces for eco-labeled
products could lead to socially beneﬁcial outcomes through allowing consumers to express their preferences
for environmentally-friendly products (Lyon & Maxwell, 2002; Podhorsky, 2008 ).
Empirical work on the topic has yielded limited evidence suggesting the eco-labeling of goods can impact
consumer behavior in both stated preference (Loureiro & Lotade, 2005; Loureiro, McCluskey & Mittelhammer, 2001 ) and revealed preference situations (Bjorner, Hansen, & Russell, 2004; Nimon & Beghin, 1999; Teisl,
Roe & Hicks, 2002 ). However, surprisingly little work has been done speciﬁcally regarding the eco-labeling
of services.1 In addition, several recent studies argue that VIBAs can be better understood using club theory,
where members voluntarily join the green club to generate credibility and/or visibility (Kotchen, 2013; Potoski
& Prakash, 2005; Potoski & Prakash, 2009; van’t Veld & Kotchen, 2011 ). To this point, however, there is a lack
of empirical evidence of any such visibility impacts. In this paper, we seek to ﬁll these gaps in the literature by
analyzing one major service sector, higher education.
Since 2006, almost 700 institutions of higher education (hereafter IHEs) have signed the American College
and University Presidents’ Climate Commitment (ACUPCC).2 The ACUPCC is a highly visible signal of the
environmental commitment of IHEs that requires signatories to take immediate steps to reduce greenhouse
gases and develop a plan for becoming climate neutral. We match the information about signatories to the US
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Department of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) database (2002–2013) to
create a 12-year panel of essentially all US 4-year-degree-granting IHEs in the public and private not-for-proﬁt
sectors. We then utilize a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence framework to identify the impact on several outcome variables
of interest including the number of applications, admitted students, and enrolled students. Furthermore, we
estimate an interrupted time series model as a robustness exercise and ﬁnd similar results.
On average, we ﬁnd that signing the ACUPCC increases student applications by around 2.5% to 3%. There
is also evidence that IHEs then capitalize on these extra applications by similarly increasing the number of
admitted students. However, there is only weak evidence that these extra admissions translate into higher
enrollment. Our point estimates suggest that enrollment increases by 1 to 2% on average, but these enrollment
estimates are signiﬁcant at conventional levels in only some of the speciﬁcations. Examining the subsamples
of public and private IHEs, we see that most of these eﬀects are being driven by the private IHEs. We also ﬁnd
that less selective IHEs experience stronger eﬀects compared to more selective IHEs.
These ﬁndings are an important contribution to the literature in that previously there had only been anecdotal evidence that an IHE’s environmental commitment matters.3 We are not aware of any prior evidence
regarding an IHE’s environmental commitment aﬀecting the enrollment decision of those admitted. Our results indicate that, while the commitment to the environment is a factor that draws interest in the form of
applications, it may not be a big enough factor to sway an individual’s ﬁnal decision of where to attend overall.
However, the stronger enrollment results for less selective IHEs indicate that at least a subset of institutions do
experience an increase in enrollment from signing.
A large theoretical literature explores ﬁrms’ motivations for adopting a VIBA. This literature tries to reconcile the standard economic theory, which suggests that individuals and ﬁrms will not be willing to incur much
private cost for products that provide beneﬁts to everybody,4 with the empirical observation of the proliferation
of VIBAs. Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) demonstrate that public recognition can be an important theoretical
motivator to adopt a VIBA because it allows the ﬁrm to appeal to environmentally focused consumers with a
higher willingness to pay. Segerson and Miceli (1998) and Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett (2000) show that ﬁrms
may participate to preempt government intervention and hence save on abatement costs. Graﬀ Zivin and Small
(2005) argue that ﬁrms are essentially competing with traditional not-for-proﬁts when they voluntarily improve
environmental performance beyond regulations and are eﬀectively soliciting contributions from customers and
shareholders. Baron (2007) similarly shows that some entrepreneurs are willing to trade away ﬁnancial gains
for social satisfaction or warm glow. Finally, a pair of papers examine the private provision of public goods
showing that such provision can be proﬁt-maximizing because of the premium that consumers are willing to
pay (Bagnoli & Watts, 2003; Besley & Ghatak, 2007 ). However, there is not as much empirical work in this area
documenting the beneﬁts of adopting a VIBA.5
Most of the empirical work concerning VIBAs has concentrated on the supply side issue of their environmental eﬀectiveness.6 Much of this literature analyzes the environmental impacts of the EPA’s 33/50 program.
Results are mixed with some studies suggesting that the program reduced toxic emissions (Khanna & Damon,
1999; Sam, Khanna & Innes, 2009 ) and others ﬁnding no eﬀect or even a positive eﬀect on emissions (GamperRabindran, 2006; Vidovic & Khanna, 2007 ). Similarly, King and Lenox (2000) ﬁnd no evidence that the chemical
industry’s Responsible Care program reduces participants’ environmental performance and Welch, Mazur, and
Bretschneider (2000) ﬁnd that the adoption of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Climate Challenge Program has
no eﬀect on emissions. Morgenstern, Pizer, and Shih (2007) utilize propensity score matching methods to establish a control group for diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation of the energy usage eﬀects of the EPA Climate
Wise program and ﬁnd mainly mixed and insigniﬁcant results. Another strand of the empirical literature has
focused on the factors that aﬀect the probability of a ﬁrm participating in a VIBA, with again much of evidence
stemming from the EPA’s 33/50 program (Arora & Cason, 1996; Arora & Cason, 1995; Khanna & Damon, 1999 ).
However, there is less research in the economics literature evaluating the impact of VIBAs on consumer demand
for the product. One notable exception is the group of papers documenting price premiums in the residential
(Brounen & Kok, 2011; Deng, Li & Quigley, 2012 ) and commercial (Eichholtz, Kok & Quigley, 2013; Eichholtz,
Kok & Quigley, 2010; Fuerst & McAllister, 2011a; Fuerst & McAllister, 2011b ) real estate markets due to energy
labels. Ultimately, the long-run success of eco-labeling programs requires that ﬁrms receive some beneﬁt to
oﬀset the additional abatement cost.
This research also contributes to the literature that explores the determinants of demand for higher education. Most commonly, research in this area focuses on factors such as price (Curs & Singell, 2002; Neill, 2009;
Soo & Elliott, 2010 ) and ﬁnancial aid (DesJardins, Ahlburg & McCall, 2006; Dynarski, 2003; Heller, 1999 ). Many
of the more recent studies in the area, however, have been focused on identifying other attributes that aﬀect
the application and admission decisions of potential students. Some of the factors that have been examined include rankings and reputation (Alter & Reback, 2014; Luca & Smith, 2013 ), spending on student services (Jacob,
McCall, and Stange 2013 ), athletic success (Pope and Pope 2009 ), and application processes (Liu, Ehrenberg
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& Mrdjenovic, 2007; Smith, Hurwitz & Howell, 2015 ). We add this line of research by considering how an
institution’s commitment to the environment inﬂuences student application and enrollment decisions.

2

Data Description

We utilize two main data sources for this analysis, the IPEDS database and the ACUPCC reporting database.7
The IPEDS data contain institution-level information from the National Center for Education Statistics (US
Department of Education. Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education Statistics 2015 ). Any
IHE that participates in any federal ﬁnancial assistance program in the United States is required to complete the
IPEDS surveys on an annual basis. As a result, there is a large amount of information available on a consistent
annual basis for nearly every IHE.8 In our analysis, we focus on information from the academic years 2002–2003
through 2013–2014.9 The time period for the analysis was selected to include a similar amount of information
from the periods before and after the emergence of the ACUPCC.
The primary information that we obtain from the IPEDS database relates to the applications and admission variables that represent the outcomes in our empirical analysis. This includes variables for the number of
ﬁrst-time, degree-seeking undergraduates who applied, were admitted, and enrolled each fall semester. The
enrollment variable includes students that were enrolled full or part-time at the institution. While we implement a ﬁxed eﬀects analysis to control for time-invariant factors unique to each IHE, we also collect a handful
of variables that vary within institutions over time, and that might be inﬂuential in student decisions. To account for how price inﬂuences student behavior, we use IPEDS variables for the undergraduate application fee
charged in a given year, as well as in-state and out-of-state tuition. To account for how the quality of a school may
be changing, we follow Pope and Pope (2009) in collecting information on the average salary of professors.10
Previous research (Smith, Hurwitz, and Howell 2015 , for example) shows that belonging to the Common Application signiﬁcantly aﬀects applications. Some IHEs join the Common Application during the period of our
panel so we include membership in the Common Application as a potentially important time-variant control.11
Finally, we supplement the IPEDS information by including variables for the number of high school graduates
(from the Digest of Education Statistics), and the real income per capita (from the Census) in the state in which
each IHE is located.
The ACUPCC originated out of planning sessions at the October 2006 meetings of the Association for the
Advancement of Sustainability in Higher Education (AASHE). A group of IHE presidents, Second Nature,
ecoAmerica, and AASHE collaborated to generate the commitment and 12 presidents became founding signatories in December 2006 (ACUPCC Mission and History 2014 ). As previously mentioned, almost 700 IHEs have
since signed the ACUPCC. In signing this commitment, IHEs agree to 1) complete an emissions inventory, 2)
within 2 years, set a target date and interim milestones for becoming climate neutral, 3) take immediate steps
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by choosing from a list of short-term actions, 4) integrate sustainability
into the curriculum and make it part of the educational experience, and 5) make the action plan, inventory and
progress reports publicly available.
In order for the signing of this commitment to plausibly aﬀect applications and admissions decisions, it
must be the case that students are aware of the commitment. There are several avenues by which students
may become aware of this information. First, the media has provided extensive coverage on this commitment
since its inception. Until recently the ACUPCC website maintained an archive of several hundred media stories
dated 2006–2014 related to the ACUPCC and its signatories. Any prospective student conducting an internet
search of an IHE’s name was therefore liable to come across any number of these stories. Also, perusal of a
signatory IHE’s website will often provide information about its ACUPCC signatory status.12 Once aware of
the ACUPCC, interested parties can ﬁnd all of the relevant information about signatories of the ACUPCC on its
publicly available ACUPCC Reporting System website. Finally, The Princeton Review’s Guide to Green Colleges
clearly identiﬁes whether or not each IHE in the guide had signed the ACUPCC from the inception of the guide
in 2010 through the end of our study period.
We limit our sample to four-year degree granting public and private-not-for-proﬁt IHEs.13 We further clean
the data to remove IHEs that report implausibly large changes in applications in two consecutive years. To do
this we examine the distribution of year-to-year percentage change in applications among the sample IHEs.
The top 1 percentile of observations display a 1 year increase that is greater than a 114.43% in applications and
the bottom 1 percentile of observations are characterized by a 1 year decrease of more than 47.54%. We remove
all observations from the IHEs falling into either the top or bottom percentile. Not counting 13 singleton observations, which are dropped from the institution ﬁxed-eﬀects analysis, the ﬁnal sample for analysis contains
12,353 observations from 1,121 IHEs spanning the years 2002–2013. Table 1 shows summary statistics for these
12,353 observations. We note that approximately 16% of the observations come from ACUPCC IHEs in years
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where they have signed on to the commitment. We also note that there is substantial variation among IHEs in
their number of applications, students admitted, and students enrolled; the standard deviation is slightly larger
than the mean for these three variables.
Table 1: Summary statistics.
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Median

Max

Obs

Applications
Admissions
Enrollment
Signed
Common
application
In-state
tuition*
Out-of-state
tuition*
HS graduates
(1,000’s)
Income per
capita*
Undergraduate
application
fee
Average
professor
salary*

5,764.10
3,307.21
1,105.19
0.16
0.27

7,366.89
3,821.01
1,250.28
0.37
0.44

9
4
1
0
0

3,086
1,938
602
0
0

72,676
35,815
9,082
1
1

12,353
12,353
12,350
12,353
12,353

18.51

12.55

0

19.34

47.95

12,313

22.31

9.42

0

21.32

47.95

12,313

111.28

94.46

3.93

74.78

430.29

12,353

44.31

6.62

30.52

43.45

78.31

12,353

47.17

21.54

0

45.63

173.17

12,023

95.68

26.11

13.23

88.60

232.48

11,197

∗ indicates measured in 1,000's of constant 2014 dollars. Undergraduate application fee is measured in constant 2014 dollars. High school graduates and income

per capita are measured for the state in which the institution is located. All of other variables are at the institution level.

The “Signed” column of Table 2 provides a description of the timing of the signing of the ACUPCC for sample
IHEs. Our sample contains 376 IHEs that sign the ACUPCC and report admissions variables to IPEDS. Table
2 shows that the largest number of sample signatories signed on to the ACUPCC in 2007. However, a lesser
number of IHEs continued to sign the ACUPCC throughout the time period of our panel. We also note that
there are nearly equal numbers of public and private not-for-proﬁt IHEs signing the agreement during the
time period of our sample. A challenge to identifying the impact of the signing of the ACUPCC is the timing of
the application cycle. IHEs vary in their application deadlines, with some deadlines as early as November (for
the following fall) and some as late as August (for that fall). Many IHEs have continuous or rolling application
deadlines rather than speciﬁc months. We make the assumption that an IHE that signs the ACUPCC in the
ﬁrst 6 months of the year (by the end of June) could aﬀect applications for the upcoming fall semester. An IHE
signing the ACUPCC in the second 6 months of the year (July through December) would not aﬀect applications
until the following fall semester.14 Based on our assumption that signing in the ﬁrst half of the year aﬀects that
fall’s applications, the “Eﬀective” column of Table 2 provides a description of the variation in the timing of
potential impact among the signatory IHEs.
Table 2: Timing of the signing of the ACUPCC.
Year

Signed

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Total

9
230
66
20
17
15
9
10
376

Overall
Eﬀective
0
173
110
36
16
18
7
16
376

Signed
6
118
37
12
6
6
2
4
191

Note: Table displays frequencies. “Signed” represents the calendar year of signing.
missions/enrollment numbers.

Public
Eﬀective
0
94
54
20
9
7
1
6
191

Signed
3
112
29
8
11
9
7
6
185

Private
Eﬀective
0
79
56
16
7
11
6
10
185

“E昀fective” represents the ﬁrst potential year a昀fecting applications/ad-
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Empirical Strategy

The IPEDS database provides information on the universe of IHEs, which means we are able to build a panel including both signatories and non-signatories. Clearly, the institution-level decision to become a signatory could
be endogenous; many institutional characteristics are unobservable to the researcher and potentially correlated
with both the signing of the ACUPCC and the outcome measures of interest such as applications and enrollment. A failure to address these unobservable characteristics could lead to biased results regarding the eﬀects
of signing the ACUPCC. Also, as noted by Morgenstern and Pizer (2007) , the challenge in the program evaluation of VIBAs is ﬁnding a credible baseline of what would have occurred absent the adoption of the program.
The two general approaches are to either compare participants to a similar group of nonparticipants or to construct a business-as-usual forecast using data on only the participants. We focus on the former approach with a
random-growth diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator. We also implement the latter approach with an interrupted
time-series estimator as a robustness check in Section 5.
We utilize the regression-adjusted version of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (hereafter DID) estimator for multiple time-periods (Angrist & Krueger, 1999; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009 ). IHE i belongs to a group, Gi ∈ {0, 1}
(where group 1 is the treatment group of signatories), and is observed in time period t ∈ {2002, 2003, … , 2013}.
The regression equation is
(1)

Yit = α + τSit + Xit ′ δ + γi + λt + εit .

where Sit is an indicator for being a signatory in a post-signing year, Xit is a vector of IHE characteristics, γi
is a time-invariant IHE-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect potentially correlated with Gi , and λt is a set of year ﬁxed eﬀects..
The coeﬀicient of interest, τ, is the DID treatment eﬀect. As noted by Angrist and Krueger (1999) , controlling
for IHE characteristics changes our estimate of τ only if Sit and Xit are correlated, conditional on IHE and year
ﬁxed eﬀects. Identiﬁcation of a causal eﬀect in [1] requires that signatories and non-signatories would have
experienced the same trends in the outcome variables had the signing of the ACUPCC not occurred. This may
not necessarily be the case. Thus, we make a modiﬁcation to [1] to allow for IHE-speciﬁc linear trends, φi , and
have
(2)

Yit = α + τSit + Xit ′ δ + γi + λt + φi t + εit .

Equation [2] is often referred to as the random-trend model when the dependent variable is in level form and the
random-growth model when the dependent variable is in log form (Wooldridge 2005 ). It is possible that other
unobservable IHE factors changed at the same time as the ACUPCC signing status. This could be problematic
for our identiﬁcation of the causal eﬀects of signing if these unobservable factors also aﬀect our outcomes of
interest. We return to this issue in more depth in Section 5.2.
Equation [2] is our main econometric speciﬁcation for the DID estimation. Hence, we are identifying the
treatment eﬀect by comparing deviations from the IHE-speciﬁc trend in the pre- and post-signatory years, relative to the aggregate time eﬀects. We estimate this model for the outcomes of (logged) applications, admissions,
and enrollment. We log the dependent variables for two reasons. First, the distributions are positively skewed
so utilizing the untransformed variables could overweight large schools relative to small schools (Pope and
Pope 2009 ). Secondly, we believe the signing of the ACUPCC is likely to aﬀect the outcome variables by a given
percentage rather than a certain level across IHEs. Recall that IHEs are ﬁrst able to sign the ACUPCC in 2006
(with the signing ﬁrst aﬀecting the fall 2007 cohort). Nevertheless, the data are available so we include observations dating back to fall 2002. This gives more information on the pre-signatory time-period and thus helps to
establish the school-speciﬁc growth rates.15 We cluster standard errors at the institution level for all regressions.
Our estimate of τ corresponds to the estimate of the average treatment eﬀect (ATE) if the treatment indicator, Sit , is exogenous given the unobserved IHE-level time-invariant heterogeneity and IHE-level growth rate.
There is a tradeoﬀ here; the results apply to the general population of IHEs only if we utilize a sample that
is representative of the population. On the other hand, the required conditional exogeneity may be more believable with a subsample of IHEs that are more homogenous. Therefore, we estimate our model with three
diﬀerent samples to test the impact of the ACUPCC signing on demand for an IHE. To begin, we compare across
a set of IHEs that are otherwise identiﬁed as having a commitment to the environment, which forms control
and treatment groups that are reasonably similar. To do this, we deﬁne our sample to be the IHEs listed in the
2015 Princeton Review’s Guide to Green Colleges.16 Among these schools, some sign the ACUPCC during the
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time period examined, and some do not. In this way, we are able to see if indicating this speciﬁc commitment
impacts the decisions of consumers among a set of schools otherwise deemed to be environmentally friendly.
Secondly, we focus only on signatories, and identiﬁcation of the signing’s impact depends on variation in the
timing of the ACUPCC signing.17 The results for this subsample are interpreted as the impact of signing the
ACUPCC, conditional on being a member of the signatory group. Finally, we utilize the full sample of IHEs
that grant 4-year degrees in the public and private not-for-proﬁt sectors to establish counterfactual common
time-eﬀects. In each of these cases, our empirical strategy involves controlling for IHE-speciﬁc time trends and
time-invariant unobservable characteristics.
Appendix Table 11 provides descriptive statistics for each of the diﬀerent samples we utilize in our DID
analysis. The values in this table are drawn from the 2005–2006 academic year, so that we can examine the similarity of the controls in each of our sample speciﬁcations with the corresponding treatment group before the
treatment occurs. For each of the three comparison groups, we present the mean values for several variables,
and then indicate when there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the means between groups.18 There are few signiﬁcant diﬀerences of note in both our Green Guide and signatory samples. When we compare those that sign
to the universe of 4-year IHEs we see highly signiﬁcant diﬀerences in nearly every variable. As subsequently
demonstrated in our ﬁrst sets of results, the estimates tend to be similar when using the various comparison
groups. For the sake of brevity, we focus on the sample of all 4-year IHEs for subsequent results testing for
heterogeneity, as well as our robustness checks and falsiﬁcation tests.

4

Results

We ﬁrst present the main results in Section 4.1 and then investigate heterogeneity in Section 4.2. Subsequently,
we show a variety of robustness checks in Section 5.

4.1

Main Results

We begin our examination of the empirical results by looking at the impact of ACUPCC signing on the number
of students applying to an IHE. These results are presented in Table 3. For each of the samples, we ﬁrst present
results for a simpliﬁed speciﬁcation that includes no control variables beyond the ﬁxed eﬀects and IHE-speciﬁc
linear trends.19 We then present the results from estimating our full model which includes the state and IHElevel control variables. The ﬁrst two columns present the results for the sample of schools listed in the Princeton
Review’s Guide to Green Colleges. Columns 3 and 4 present our sample that includes only schools that sign
the ACUPCC agreement over the period sampled, and exploits variation in the timing of signing, and columns
5 and 6 present the results for the full sample of 4-year IHEs. In each case, it is estimated that there is a positive
and signiﬁcant impact on applications. The magnitudes of the estimated impact are quite similar in each case,
with an estimated increase of between 2.65% and 3.13%, depending on the speciﬁcation.20
Table 3: Regression results: applications.
(1)
Signed
Common
application
HS graduates
(1,000’s)
Income per
capita
(1,000’s)
Undergraduate
application
fee

0.0281**
(0.0138)

(2)
Green guide
0.0294**
(0.0146)
0.0722***

(3)
0.0265*
(0.0141)

(4)
Signatories
0.0297**
(0.0151)
0.0911***

(5)

(6)
All 4-year IHEs

0.0295***
(0.0112)

0.0313***
(0.0120)
0.0747***

(0.0227)
0.00236***

(0.0233)
0.00379***

(0.0162)
0.00146**

(0.000912)
0.0114**

(0.00112)
0.00972*

(0.000726)
0.00501

(0.00521)
0.000223

(0.00533)
–0.000318

(0.00331)
–0.000679*

(0.000637)

(0.000647)

(0.000379)
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Ln in-state
tuition
(1,000’s)
(lagged 1
year)
Ln out-state
tuition
(1,000’s)
(lagged 1
year)
Ln Avg. Prof.
Salary
(1,000’s)
(lagged 1
year)
Observations
R-squared

Hickman and Meyer

3,648
0.990

–0.0952*

–0.0117

–0.0298

(0.0554)

(0.0729)

(0.0372)

0.0282

–0.0164

0.0237

(0.0236)

(0.0323)

(0.0243)

0.141

0.0883

–0.0466

(0.0955)

(0.0989)

(0.0566)

3,377
0.989

4,205
0.988

3,854
0.987

12,353
0.987

11,216
0.987

Notes: table presents regression results from models in which dependent variable is ln of applications. Samples vary as described in text. Standard errors, clustered at IHE level, presented in parentheses. All speciﬁcations include IHE ﬁxed e昀fects, IHE-speciﬁc linear trends, and year ﬁxed e昀fects. All monetary variables
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.10 level.
∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.05 level,
∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.01 level,
measured in constant 2014 dollars.

Next, we examine how IHEs respond to the increase in applications received by utilizing the number of students
admitted as the dependent variable in our analysis. Table 4 follows the design of Table 3, with two model
speciﬁcations for each of our three DID samples. As with the results for applications, the signing of the ACUPCC
is estimated to have a consistently positive and signiﬁcant impact on admissions for a given institution. The
magnitude of the impact on admissions is estimated to be larger than the impact on applications for both the
signatory only and Green Guide samples, while it is slightly smaller when using the sample of all 4-year IHEs.
The results here indicate that, as potential students respond to an institution’s commitment to the environment
by increasing applications, the institutions are responding by accepting more students. One explanation for
this is that IHEs are willing and able to expand the number of students when they experience an increase in the
number of applicants. Alternatively, it could be that IHEs face increasing competition for students and must
admit more to yield the desired number of enrolled students.
Table 4: Regression results: admissions.
(1)
Signed
IHE-level
controls
Observations
R-squared

(2)
Green guide

(3)

(4)
Signatories

(5)

(6)
All 4-year IHEs

0.0361**
(0.0147)
No

0.0327**
(0.0155)
Yes

0.0334**
(0.0151)
No

0.0374**
(0.0159)
Yes

0.0263**
(0.0118)
No

0.0279**
(0.0124)
Yes

3,648
0.988

3,377
0.988

4,205
0.985

3,854
0.985

12,353
0.981

11,216
0.982

Notes: Table presents regression results from models in which dependent variable is ln of admissions. Samples vary as described in text. Standard errors, clustered at IHE level, presented in parentheses. All speciﬁcations include IHE ﬁxed e昀fects, IHE-speciﬁc linear trends, and year ﬁxed e昀fects. IHE Level Controls are
common application, HS graduates, income per capita, undergraduate application fee, lagged in-state tuition, lagged out-of-state tuition and lagged professor
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.10 level.
∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.05 level,
∗∗∗
salary. All monetary variables measured in constant 2014 dollars.
denotes signiﬁcance at 0.01 level,

To this point we have consistent evidence across all three samples indicating that IHEs signing the ACUPCC
agreement experience signiﬁcant increases in applications received and students accepted for admission. The
next logical question to consider is whether or not there will be an actual increase in enrollment at a given IHE
as a result. To examine this, we follow the same format as the previous results, and utilize ﬁrst-time enrollment
in the fall of each year as the dependent variable in our various speciﬁcations. The results of these analyses
are presented in Table 5. In this case, the estimated impact of signing is not consistently signiﬁcant across our
samples. The models using the Green Guide and signatory only samples show positive results at a moderate
level of signiﬁcance. The estimated magnitude of the impact on enrollment is smaller than that on applications
and admissions. In the Green Guide sample, for instance, the point estimates for enrollment are almost exactly
half the size of the estimated impacts on admissions displayed in Table 4. The sample of all 4-year IHEs yields
insigniﬁcant results.

Brought to you by | Marquette University
Authenticated
Download Date | 2/1/17 4:02 PM

Hickman and Meyer

DE GRUYTER

Table 5: Regression results: enrollment.
(1)
Signed
IHE-level
controls
Observations
R-squared

(2)
Green guide

(3)

(4)
Signatories

(5)

(6)
All 4-year IHEs

0.0182*
(0.00999)
No

0.0150
(0.0101)
Yes

0.0216*
(0.0113)
No

0.0224*
(0.0120)
Yes

0.00807
(0.00860)
No

0.00842
(0.00894)
Yes

3,648
0.994

3,472
0.994

4,204
0.990

3,853
0.990

12,350
0.987

11,214
0.988

Notes: Table presents regression results from models in which dependent variable is ln of ﬁrst-time enrollments. Samples vary as described in text. Standard
errors, clustered at IHE level, presented in parentheses. All speciﬁcations include IHE ﬁxed e昀fects, IHE-speciﬁc linear trends, and year ﬁxed e昀fects. IHE-level controls are common application, HS graduates, income per capita, undergraduate application fee, lagged in-state tuition, lagged out-of-state tuition and lagged
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.10 level.
∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.05 level,
professor salary. All monetary variables measured in constant 2014 dollars.
∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.01 level,

Overall, there is some evidence of an impact on enrollments, but it is not as strong as the evidence of impacts
on applications and admissions. One possible explanation for this is that the application process may be fairly
low-cost and require little in the way of commitment from the consumer, particularly when compared to the
enrollment decision. The signing of an environmental commitment may draw a potential student’s interest and
entice him or her to apply, but this factor alone may not be enough to impact the decision of where to ultimately
enroll. Another potential explanation is that IHEs may not have the capacity (or desire) to actually enroll more
students at a particular time. If this is true, and the ACUPCC signing does increase interest from consumers,
then it is possible for the institution to respond in other ways. For example, the institution may choose to increase
the quality of its student body, as opposed to the quantity, by being more selective. An increase in demand might
also lead to a decision to increase the price of attending. To investigate these possible responses, we estimated
the same set of models shown in Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 using the average SAT score of the incoming class,
the real rate of out-of-state tuition, and the admit rate (admissions/applications) as dependent variables. We
did not ﬁnd any evidence of statistical signiﬁcance in these models.21 We explore this further in SubSection 4.2
where we look for heterogeneous IHE responses.

4.2

Heterogeneity in the Results

It is important to recognize that diﬀerent types of IHEs may experience distinct responses to the signing of the
ACUPCC. To begin exploring possible heterogeneity, we follow Pope and Pope (2009) in examining diﬀerent
impacts for private and public IHEs; these results are displayed in Table 6. To simplify this and all subsequent
tables, we present only the results of the speciﬁcations with the full set of control variables and for all 4-year
IHEs.22 The estimated coeﬀicients indicate that the increase in applications due to signing is primarily observed
in private institutions; these diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant. Note that this diﬀerence does not appear to
be driven by diﬀerences in the frequency or timing of signing by sector; the descriptive information in Table
2 reveals strikingly similar patterns in the number of IHEs signing the ACUPCC agreement over time in each
sector. One possible explanation for the diﬀerential impact across sectors is that the typical student interested in
attending a private institution has a diﬀerent set of preferences than the typical student applying to public sector
schools. For example, the decision to apply to IHEs in the public sector may largely be driven by geographic
location, given diﬀerentials in tuition between in-state and out-of-state students. The decision to apply to IHEs
in the private sector, on the other hand, may be more likely to be inﬂuenced by the speciﬁc attributes oﬀered.23
The results in Table 6 seem to indicate that a commitment to the environment may be one such attribute.
Table 6: Regression results: results by sector.
(1)

Signed
Observations
R-squared

(2)
Ln applications
Public
Private

(4)
Ln admissions
Public
Private

(5)

0.0150
(0.0142)
4,325
0.988

0.0201
(0.0169)
4,325
0.982

–0.00279
(0.0119)
4,325
0.986

0.0411**
(0.0186)
6,891
0.983

(3)

0.0367**
(0.0177)
6,891
0.975

(6)
Ln enrollment
Public
Private
0.0165
(0.0133)
6,889
0.977
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Notes: Table presents regression results from sample of all 4-year IHEs. Columns in this table represent results when further restricting samples based on sector
of institution. Standard errors, clustered at IHE level, presented in parentheses. All speciﬁcations include IHE ﬁxed e昀fects, IHE-speciﬁc linear trends, year ﬁxed
e昀fects, common application, HS graduates, income per capita, undergraduate application fee, lagged in-state tuition, lagged out-of-state tuition (public only)
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.10 level.
∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at
and lagged professor salary. All monetary variables measured in constant 2014 dollars.
∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.01 level,
0.05 level,

When we examine the impact on admissions by sector, displayed in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6, we again see
that the signiﬁcant increases as a result of signing seem to be limited to IHEs in the private not-for-proﬁt sector.
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 6, we proceed to estimate the impacts on enrollment by sector of institution. As with
both applications and admissions, the point estimate is larger for private institutions. However, the coeﬀicients
are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Furthermore, the IHE response to an increase in student interest may depend upon the position of the
IHE. For example, more selective IHEs may be more likely to be meeting their enrollment targets whereas less
selective IHEs may not be doing so. Thus, we may not expect to see as much of an increase in admissions or
enrollment at more selective IHEs compared to less selective IHEs. To investigate this issue, we divide our
sample by the average admit rate in the years prior to 2007. We classify IHEs with average admit rates below
the median as more selective and IHEs with average admit rates above the median as less selective. We then
estimate 2 on these subsamples for the outcomes of (logged) applications, admissions, and enrollment. These
results are displayed in Table 7. Point estimates for the eﬀect of signing on applications are positive for both
subgroups, but only statistically signiﬁcant for less selective IHEs. The point estimate is also more than twice
as large for less selective IHEs compared to more selective IHEs. A possible reason for this diﬀerence is that
students trying for more selective IHEs may be primarily focused on academic attributes whereas students
applying to less selective IHEs may be relatively more concerned with other non-academic factors such as the
ACUPCC. However, one would likely require student level data to test this explanation. A similar pattern holds
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7, for the impact of signing on admissions. Finally, as theorized, we ﬁnd evidence
of an increase in enrollment due to signing only for less selective IHEs. We ﬁnd essentially no impact of signing
on enrollment for more selective IHEs. We then tested for impacts on admit rates and the SAT score of the
incoming class to see if more selective IHEs capitalize on increased student interest by becoming even more
selective. Coeﬀicients in these regressions are near 0 and not statistically signiﬁcant.24
Table 7: Regression results: results by selectivity.
(1)

Signed
Observations
R-squared

(2)
Ln Applications
More
Less Selective
Selective

(4)
Ln Admissions
More
Less Selective
Selective

(5)

0.0210
(0.0163)
5,419
0.987

0.0159
(0.0168)
5,419
0.980

–0.00656
(0.0130)
5,418
0.987

0.0473***
(0.0181)
5,797
0.984

(3)

0.0418**
(0.0186)
5,797
0.984

(6)
Ln Enrollment
More
Less Selective
Selective
0.0282**
(0.0125)
5,796
0.988

Notes: Table presents regression results from sample of all 4-year IHEs. Columns in this table represent results when further restricting samples based on IHE
selectivity. Standard errors, clustered at IHE level, presented in parentheses. All speciﬁcations include IHE ﬁxed e昀fects, IHE-speciﬁc linear trends, year ﬁxed
e昀fects, common application, HS graduates, income per capita, undergraduate application fee, lagged in-state tuition, lagged out-of-state tuition and lagged
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.10 level.
∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.05 level,
∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.01 level,
professor salary.

5
5.1

Alternative Speciﬁcations and Robustness Checks
Robustness of the DID Application Results

We investigate the robustness of our DID estimates regarding the impact of signing the ACUPCC on applications in a few ways. First, we investigate the use of IHE-speciﬁc quadratic time trends. The analyses in Table 3,
Table 4, Table 5, Table 6, Table 7 include linear time trends, but it is possible that a more ﬂexible functional form
better captures IHE-speciﬁc trends. Column 1 of Table 8 shows the results when estimating the model with
logged applications as the dependent variable and including IHE-speciﬁc quadratic time trends. The results
are similar to those observed in the analogous column 6 of Table 3.25 The second robustness check involves the
assignment of ACUPCC signing to a speciﬁc year where we expect an impact on applications. Our primary
analysis assumes IHEs signing in the ﬁrst half of the year will see an impact (if one exists) in the fall of that
year. Those signing in the second half of the year will see a potential impact the following year. We estimate the
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models using logged applications as the dependent variable, and shift the cutoﬀ to assignment one month in
each direction.26 Columns 2 and 3 of Table 8 display the results for this robustness check; the estimated eﬀect
does not seem sensitive to our choice of the month cutoﬀ.
Table 8: Regression results: robustness checks.

Signed
Immediately
after

(1)
Quadratic
trends

(2)
May cutoﬀ

(3)
July cutoﬀ

(4)
Excluding
2007

(5)
Additional
IHE
controls

(6)
Adding
SAT

0.0242**
(0.0118)

0.0273**
(0.0114)

0.0282**
(0.0120)

0.0427***
(0.0148)

0.0313***
(0.0120)

0.0242**
(0.0121)

0.0285**
(0.0112)
0.0204
(0.0152)
0.0195
(0.0194)
0.0101
(0.0233)
0.000637

1 year after
2 years after
3 years after
≥4 years
after
Observations
R-squared

(7)
Timing of
eﬀects

11,216

11,216

11,216

10,235

10,430

8,408

(0.0285)
11,216

0.991

0.987

0.987

0.987

0.988

0.989

0.987

Notes: Table presents regression results from sample of all 4-year IHEs and models in which dependent variable is ln of applications. Standard errors, clustered at
IHE level, presented in parentheses. All speciﬁcations include IHE ﬁxed e昀fects, IHE-speciﬁc linear trends, year ﬁxed e昀fects, common application, HS graduates,
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at
income per capita, undergraduate application fee, lagged in-state tuition, lagged out-of-state tuition and lagged professor salary.
∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.05 level,
∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.01 level,
0.10 level.

5.2

Alternative Explanations and Falsiﬁcation Tests

A leading concern for our identiﬁcation is that the signing of the ACUPCC could have coincided with other
changes at the IHE level. If any such changes led to an increase in student interest and applications, we could
be misattributing this onto the ACUPCC signing. This will not cause problems for identiﬁcation in the DID approach if any such changes are common between signatories and non-signatories. If however, any such changes
are unique to signatories, it could be cause for concern. We can never completely rule out this possibility because there are many unobservable factors that could have changed only for signatories at the time of signing.
However, we take several approaches to assuage this concern.
First, it is clear from Table 2 that the single largest eﬀective signing year was 2007. Perhaps there was something special happening during this year, common to signatories, that also aﬀected student interest. Therefore,
we exclude all observations from 2007 and re-estimate 2. As seen in column 4 of Table 8, the estimated eﬀect of
signing on applications actually grows in magnitude and is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Next, we expand our list of time-varying IHE controls beyond what is included in Table 3. We add the following one year lags of student demographics: percent female, percent Asian, percent Indian, percent Hispanic,
percent Black, and percent non-resident alien. These demographics thus represent the average characteristics
of the IHE student body at the time of application. We also add an indicator to characterize whether or not an
IHE hired a new president eﬀective for the current year. The rationale here is that a new president may change
many unobservable things at an IHE while simultaneously signing the ACUPCC. As shown in column 5 of
Table 8, these additional time-varying controls do not change the results. We then add in the average SAT score
while retaining the controls from column 5 and report these results in column 6 of Table 8. Although the sample size is considerably smaller when including SAT, the coeﬀicient on signing the ACUPCC remains of similar
magnitude and signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Another issue is the timing of the eﬀects. For instance, there could be an immediate jump in applications
after signing that ultimately declines or there could be a delay in prospective students becoming aware of and
responding to the signing. To investigate this issue, we return to 2 and replace the indicator, Sit , with a set
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of indicators representing the number of years that have passed since signing. We create indicators for the
immediate eﬀect, and for 1, 2, 3, and 4 or more years after the ACUPCC signing. The coeﬀicients on these
indicators are then interpreted as relative to the omitted category of the pre-signing years. Column 7 of Table
8 shows that the immediate eﬀect is the largest and the only eﬀect that is separately statistically signiﬁcant
at conventional levels.27 Also, there appear to be smaller but still positive eﬀects on applications 1 to 3 years
after signing. However, it also seems that the eﬀects dissipate and may eventually disappear after 4 years have
passed. This motivates a falsiﬁcation test regarding moving the timing of signing. We move the actual signing
date 2 years into the future to create a falsiﬁed signing date. Given, the pattern in column 6 of Table 8, it would
be problematic to still ﬁnd signiﬁcant impacts of signing with this falsiﬁed signing date. Note that, with the
falsiﬁed signing date, the ﬁrst 2 years of actual eﬀects from signing would be treated as occurring during the
pre-signing period. Column 1 of Table 9 shows that we ﬁnd no eﬀect on applications when using this 2 year
delayed false signing date.28
Table 9: Regression results: falsiﬁcation tests.

Signed
Observations
R-squared

(1)
Delay 2 years
(applications)

(2)
Instructional
expenditures

(3)
Academic
support

(4)
Student services

(5)
Auxiliary
enterprises

–0.00966
(0.0121)
11,216
0.987

–0.00322
(0.0198)
10,009
0.995

–0.0163
(0.0217)
9,980
0.990

–0.00875
(0.0213)
10,003
0.983

0.00199
(0.0226)
9,949
0.984

Notes: Table presents regression results from sample of all 4-year IHEs and models in which dependent variable is logged. Standard errors, clustered at IHE level,
presented in parentheses. All speciﬁcations include IHE ﬁxed e昀fects, IHE-speciﬁc linear trends, year ﬁxed e昀fects, common application, HS graduates, income
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.10
per capita, undergraduate application fee, lagged in-state tuition, lagged out-of-state tuition and lagged professor salary.
∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.05 level,
∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.01 level,
level.

Finally, we implement a series of falsiﬁcation tests to look for changes in observable IHE characteristics that may
coincide with signing the ACUPCC. As discussed, we cannot control for every possible confounding variable,
but we can look at a series of key expenditure variables available in IPEDS data. This allows us to determine
whether there seems to be a shift in IHE administration or policy of which signing the ACUPCC is just one
part. We return to equation 2 and replace the outcome variable with expenditures, separately, for each of the
following categories: instructional, academic support, student services, and auxiliary enterprises.29 We choose
these categories because these are the ones that are likely to inﬂuence student recruitment. If we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant coeﬀicient for our ACUPCC signing variable, it might indicate that the signing was indeed coinciding
with other factors driving our ﬁndings regarding applications, admissions, and enrollments. As evidenced by
the results in columns 2 through 5 of Table 9, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcance that would justify this particular
concern.

5.3

Interrupted Time Series

As a ﬁnal robustness check, we estimate an interrupted time series model, which allows the pre-signing and
post-signing trends to diﬀer.30 Prior to presenting the regression results, we ﬁrst provide some graphical evidence of a discontinuity in applications at the eﬀective signing year. We do the following in Figure 1 to show
the discontinuity for logged applications.31
(1) Take the natural log of applications.
(2) Demean logged applications for each IHE.
(3) Plot average demeaned applications across sample IHEs versus Tit̂ .32
(4) Draw a line of best ﬁt for average demeaned applications on each side of the eﬀective signing year.
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Figure 1: Applications relative to ACUPCC eﬀective signing date.

The diﬀerence in the intercepts of the lines of best ﬁt at Tit̂ = 0 gives us an idea of the magnitude of the
discontinuity. This is 0.0231 − (−0.0114) = 0.0345. Thus, on average, applications increase by about 3.5% at the
eﬀective signing year according to this graphical evidence. We also note that the trends of logged applications
in both the pre-signing period and in the post-signing appear linear.
Table 10 presents the results of our interrupted time series analysis using both linear and quadratic controls.
For both linear and quadratic speciﬁcations, the results indicate that signing has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on applications.33 As with the results in the previous section, we ﬁnd that the signal of environmental
commitment provided by the ACUPCC has a substantial impact on the number of potential students that decide to apply.34 We also look for discontinuities in other factors that could explain the change in applications
simultaneously with the signing of the ACUPCC. Speciﬁcally, we estimate eq. 4 for the dependent variables
of real application fee,35 logged real application fee, logged real out-of-state tuition, and percentage of tenuretrack faculty36 and ﬁnd no evidence of discontinuities. As seen in Appendix Table 13, estimated coeﬀicients are
near 0, with relatively large standard errors. This provides further evidence to solidify our claim that changes
in applications and other outcome variables are driven by potential students responding to the signing of the
ACUPCC, rather than simultaneous changes in other factors.
Table 10: Interrupted time series results: bandwidth of 4 years.
(1)
Linear
Signed
Observations
R-squared
Number of
IHEs

0.0367***
(0.0136)
2,727
0.487
319

(2)
Applications
Quadratic
0.0311*
(0.0174)
2,727
0.487
319

(3)
Linear
0.0403**
(0.0162)
2,727
0.346
319

(4)
Admissions
Quadratic
0.0145
(0.0247)
2,727
0.346
319

(5)
Linear
0.00619
(0.0115)
2,726
0.118
319

(6)
Enrollment
Quadratic
0.00839
(0.0227)
2,726
0.118
319

Notes: Table presents result from interrupted time series models. The bandwidth of 4 years in these models means we include IHEs signing in 2009 or earlier. Standard errors, clustered at IHE level, presented in parentheses. Dependent variables in each regression are in natural logarithmic form. Each regression
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.10 level.
∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.05 level,
∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.01 level,
includes year and IHE ﬁxed e昀fects.
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Conclusion

The eco-labeling of products is increasingly used as a way for ﬁrms to send a signal to consumers about the
ﬁrm’s level of commitment to the environment, and is a leading example of a VIBA. To this point, however,
little empirical research has investigated how successful VIBAs have been in impacting consumer behavior.
This is especially true when it comes to the case of the eco-labeling of services. In this study, we analyze the
student response to the American College and University Presidents’ Climate Commitment, an eco-label in
higher education.
In this case, the primary response that we investigate is whether or not the decision to apply to a particular
institution is inﬂuenced by the institution’s signing of this agreement. Using both diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence and
interrupted time-series strategies, we ﬁnd consistent evidence of a signiﬁcant positive response in the number of
applications received after signing the agreement. We also ﬁnd evidence that the IHEs respond to this increase
in interest from students by signiﬁcantly increasing the number of students they admit. However, we ﬁnd
weaker evidence regarding the impact of the eco-label on the ultimate decision of whether or not to enroll in
a particular IHE. Higher education is an example of a costly service with many attributes; thus we may expect
the IHE’s green commitment to not be as inﬂuential in the enrollment decision. In contrast, the marginal cost of
sending an application is rather low so students may be willing to act on environmental information. In relation
to the theory of green clubs, evidence does ﬁrmly suggest that the club increases the visibility of member IHEs.
However, it is less clear that this increased visibility translates into changes in individuals’ costly decisions.
The strongest enrollment eﬀects are concentrated in less selective IHEs. One explanation is that these same
institutions may not have as ﬁrm of a capacity constraint compared to more selective IHEs – which likely receive
plenty of applications to reach enrollment targets. Another possible explanation is that a green commitment
may simply not be as important to students as other factors when choosing among more selective IHEs but an
eﬀective diﬀerentiator for less selective IHEs. Data at the prospective student level could help determine the
ultimate reasons for the heterogeneous enrollment impacts.
There are two important dimensions to consider when assessing the potential of VIBAs to be eﬀective environmental management programs. The ﬁrst dimension, environmental eﬀectiveness, has received somewhat
more attention. There, results are mixed as to whether or not VIBAs generate signiﬁcant public beneﬁts. Regardless of the extent of public beneﬁts, however, we would not expect speciﬁc VIBAs to survive if they do
not generate suﬀicient private beneﬁts to oﬀset the private cost of their adoption. Our results show that VIBAs
can be eﬀective along this dimension in at least generating more attention for the service. However, the open
question is under what circumstances this extra attention then translates into more lasting changes in consumer
behavior.

Notes
1 We are aware of only one working paper in this area. Sipic (2010) ﬁnds a substantial price premium for the Blue Flag label for marinas
and beaches within a hedonic framework. The author utilizes instrumental variables to address the endogeneity of certiﬁcation in the
cross-sectional analysis.
2 As of October 2015, the ACUPCC has been renamed the “Carbon Commitment.” Second Nature now also oﬀers IHEs the ability to
sign additional commitments to climate resilience. This change has no bearing on the study at hand because it occurred after our sample
period.
3 For example, according to Princeton Review’s 2014 “College Hopes and Worries Survey,” 62% of college applicants say that having
information about an IHE's commitment to environmental issues would impact their decision to apply to a school.
4 An entire literature has been devoted to explaining why individuals voluntarily contribute to public goods.
5 There are many papers in the ﬁnance literature that examine the eﬀect of environmental performance (often referred to as Corporate Social Responsibility) on ﬁrm ﬁnancials. The results there are mixed; for reviews of these studies see Graﬀ Zivin and Small (2005),
McWilliams and Siegel (2000), and Stefan and Paul (2008) .
6 Alberini and Segerson (2002) provide an excellent analysis of the earlier theoretical and empirical literature related to VIBAs.
7 We are grateful to Second Nature for providing us with the ACUPCC data in spreadsheet format.
8 While all institutions participating in federal ﬁnancial aid programs are required to complete IPEDS surveys, not all surveys are required from all types of institutions every year, and not all information on a given survey will be completed by each IHE in each year. As a
result, the number of IHEs for which information is available depends on the variables used in our analysis, and the number of observations
will vary with each model speciﬁcation.
9 In any given survey year, some IHEs report information on applications in the current year, and some report for the previous year. In
order to include the most recent information, we include data for the IHEs that have reported for the 2013–14 academic year, despite the
fact that not all institutions have reported.
10 We also gather SAT information where it is available. We sum the average of the 25th and 75th percentiles of math and verbal scores for
incoming ﬁrst-year students. These scores are missing for over 25% of our observations but we include it as a robustness check in Section
5.
11 We obtain this information directly from the Common Application (www.commonapp.org).
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12 As
examples, we found articles in local media (http://www.startribune.com/several-colleges-push-for-eco-friendlycampuses/124808624/), on IHE websites (http://www.pugetsound.edu/news-and-events/campus-news/details/245/), and in more
general environmental news sources (http://www.environmentalleader.com/2013/04/08/colby-college-achieves-carbon-neutrality/)
13 This corresponds to the 2000 Carnegie Classiﬁcations of 15-32, sectors 1-2.
14 We conduct some robustness tests on this assumption in Section 5.
15 Leaving out observations prior to 2006 does not substantially change results. Point estimates and p-values change only slightly and are
available upon request.
16 The complete guide we used to construct our sample can be found online at http://www.princetonreview.com/collegerankings/green-guide?rankings=green-colleges. This guide lists 353 IHEs the Princeton Review determined to be “…those with the highest
Green Ratings, featuring green initiatives that enhance students' academic experience and quality of life in ways that truly merit recognition.” Green Rating scores are determined based on surveys regarding institutional policies. The guide presents these IHEs in alphabetical
order without numerical ranking (or speciﬁc Green Rating), though those in the top 50 of Green Rating scores are highlighted.
17 Note that the variation in timing of signing is important here because, if all signatories had signed at the same time, any eﬀects on the
outcome variables would be subsumed into the year ﬁxed-eﬀects.
18 For the “signatories only” sample, we test for diﬀerences between those that signed in 2007 and those that signed later. A little under
half of those that sign do so in 2007.
19 In addition to reducing sample size, the primary reason for not including these variables in all speciﬁcations is that there is also a
potential endogeneity issue. For example, it is possible that cost of attendance is decided, in part, based on the number of applicants a
school expects to receive. Because of this, we present results with and without these controls, and lag the total cost of attendance and
average professor salary variables by one year. We also estimated the simple speciﬁcation using the restricted sample size that results from
including the control variables. The signiﬁcance and magnitude did not change in any meaningful way when the sample size is restricted.
The results of these speciﬁcations (as well as the analogous results for admissions and enrollment) are available upon request.
20 To give a sense of the magnitude of the results, we present the results of our main speciﬁcations using the level of applications, admissions, and enrollment (rather than the logged values) in Appendix Table 12. The results are less statistically signiﬁcant when estimating in
levels, with the coeﬀicient on signing not signiﬁcantly impacting admissions at conventional levels. The signing of ACUPCC is estimated
to increase the number of applications, all else equal, by around 187.
21 The results of these analyses are available upon request.
22 The results do not vary substantially in either magnitude or signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬀicients when examining the simple
speciﬁcation without controls for each of the models, or when limiting the sample to green guide or signatory comparison groups. Full
results are available upon request.
23 One piece of evidence that supports this theory can be found by comparing the coeﬀicients on the state-level control variables. Applications to public IHEs are signiﬁcantly positively inﬂuenced by income and the number of high school graduates in the state, whereas
applications to private institutions have no statistical relationship with these state-level controls.
24 These results are available upon request.
25 We also estimate the quadratic trends models with admissions and enrollment as the dependent variables, and obtain results qualitatively similar to those in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively.
26 To clarify, the standard cutoﬀ we use to assign signing to year of impact on applications is the end of June. In this speciﬁcation we
change the cutoﬀ to the end of May and the end of July in separate models.
27 We also estimated the same model adding an interaction between indicators for signing during the fall application season (Aug.-Dec.)
and being in the year immediately following signing. The point estimate on the coeﬀicient of the interaction term is –0.00897 with a p-value
of 0.608 so we do not ﬁnd any evidence that the season of signing matters.
28 We also do the same estimation when moving the signing date 1 year into the future. The estimated coeﬀicient on “signed” is 0.00354
and insigniﬁcant with a standard error of 0.0119.
29 The IPEDS website lists the description of this category as operating expenditures related to operations in the IHE that are generally
self-supporting, such as residence halls and student health services.
30 We provide the details of this empirical model in the appendix.
31 We also created analogous ﬁgures for the outcomes of admissions and enrollment but omit them here. The admissions graph shows a
similar discontinuity whereas the enrollment graph shows a change in slope but no visible discontinuity at the signing date. These ﬁgures
are available upon request.
32 Note that this is equivalent to plotting the average residuals from the regression of the logged outcome on a set of IHE ﬁxed-eﬀects.
33 We also estimated with a bandwidth of 3 years, instead of 4. As an additional robustness check, we limited our sample to those IHEs
that created a balanced panel using a bandwidth of 4 years. The signiﬁcance levels and general conclusions are similar to those found in
Table 10. These tables are available upon request.
34 For the admissions variable, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive impact of signing using linear controls, but no signiﬁcant impact when
including quadratic controls. We ﬁnd no evidence of a signiﬁcant impact on enrollment in either speciﬁcation.
35 We include the level of real application fee in addition to logged real application fee because there are some IHEs with $0 application
fees. These schools are dropped in the logged analysis.
36 Many IHE observable characteristics relating to the student proﬁle such as average SAT score are likely impacted by the pool of applicants received by the IHE and hence impacted by the signing of the ACUPCC. Thus, we choose IHE characteristics relating to the faculty
as a plausibly exogenous factors that should not display discontinuities.
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Appendix: Interrupted Times Series Details
For each signatory IHE, i, deﬁne the ACUPCC eﬀective signing year37 as ki . Normalize by the eﬀective signing
year so that
(3)

Tit̂ = Tit − ki

represents the year relative to the eﬀective signing year. We specify a bandwidth, b, and include all IHEs in the
sample that are observed for b years prior to and post signing. Then, for ∣Tit̂ ∣ ≤ b, the baseline38 econometric
model is
Yit = α + γi + τ × I (Tit̂ > ki ) + β1 × Tit̂ + β2 × Tit̂ × I (Tit̂ > ki ) + φt + εit ,

(4)

where γi are IHE ﬁxed-eﬀects, I(.) represents the indicator function, and φt are year ﬁxed-eﬀects (to account for
common changes in the dependent variable over calendar years). For the baseline results, we set b=4; therefore,
we include all IHEs with an eﬀective signing year of 2009 or earlier so that each IHE has an equal number
of observations prior to and post signing. Thus, τ is the eﬀect of signing on the outcome variable, β1 is the
pre-signing slope, and β2 is the change in the slope in the post-signing period relative to the pre-signing period.

Appendix Tables
Table 11: Summary statistics of DID sampling groups.
Brought to you by | Marquette University
Authenticated
Download Date | 2/1/17 4:02 PM

DE GRUYTER

Applications
Admissions
Enrolled
Common
application
In-state
tuition
Out-of-state
tuition
HS
graduates
(1,000s)
Income per
capita
(1,000s)
Undergraduate
application
Fee
Average
professor
salary
(1,000’s)
Private
Number of
IHEs

Hickman and Meyer

Green Guide
Not

2007

Signatories
2008–2013

All 4-year IHEs
Signed
Not

All IHEs

Signed

4,925.4

8,521.5

10,354.5*

7,652.2

6,172.6*

6,857.8

3,931.0***

2,986.3
1,072.1
0.219

5,145.2
1,728.3
0.385

5,408.5
2,007.3
0.362

4,598.1
1,537.2
0.36

3,747.0*
1,300.0
0.34

4,141.1
1,409.8
0.35

2,392.0***
898.2***
0.15***

16.99

17.4

20.5*

16.2

17.4

16.9

17.0

20.7

23.7

25.4

22.7

22.0

22.3

19.9***

106.8

113.3

133.7*

113.8

101.9

107.4

106.4

43.4

44.9

45.0

45.1

44.8

44.9

42.7***

53.3

64.3

67.9

61.7

58.7

60.1

49.6***

94.39

109.6

118.9***

104.2

101.8

102.9

89.9***

0.61
1036

0.48
208

0.54
105

0.47
163

0.53
189

0.50
352

0.66***
684

Notes: Statistics come from the 2005–2006 academic year, before the impact of ACUPCC signing takes place. Tuition, income, application fee and professor
salary variables measured in constant 2014 dollars. The number of observations is slightly lower for the tuition, application fee, and professor salary variables.
∗ indicates means di昀ferent at 10% level,
∗∗ indicates means di昀ferent at 5% level,
∗∗∗ indicates means di昀ferent at 1% level.

Table 12: Regression results: levels.
(1)
Signed
IHE-level
controls
Observations
R-squared

(2)
Applications

(3)

(4)
Admissions

(5)

(6)
Enrollment

183.68*
(96.10)
No

186.51*
(101.52)
Yes

87.63
(55.21)
No

76.83
(52.50)
Yes

19.50*
(11.82)
No

13.66
(12.13)
Yes

12,353
0.988

11,216
0.987

12,353
0.984

11,216
0.987

12,350
0.989

11,214
0.990

Notes: Table presents regression results from sample of all 4-year IHEs. Standard errors, clustered at IHE level, presented in parentheses. All speciﬁcations include IHE ﬁxed e昀fects, IHE-speciﬁc linear trends, and year ﬁxed e昀fects. IHE-level controls are common application, HS graduates, income per capita, undergraduate application fee, lagged in-state tuition, lagged out-of-state tuition and lagged professor salary. All monetary variables measured in constant 2014 dollars.
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.10 level.
∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.05 level,
∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.01 level,

Table 13: Interrupted time series falsiﬁcation tests.

Signed
Observations
R-squared
Number of IHEs

(1)
Application fee

(2)
Ln application fee

(3)
Ln tuition

(3)
% tenure track

0.475
(0.837)
2,698
0.348
319

–0.00540
(0.0105)
2,582
0.392
313

–0.00527
(0.0122)
2,697
0.21
319

–0.000495
(0.00700)
2,638
0.035
309
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Notes: Table presents result from interrupted time series models, with dependent variable listed. Undergraduate application fee is measured in constant 2014
dollars and tuition is measured in thousands of constant 2014 dollars. Each speciﬁcation includes linear trend variables. The bandwidth of 4 years in these models
means we include IHEs signing in 2009 or earlier. Standard errors, clustered at IHE level, presented in parentheses. Each regression includes year and IHE ﬁxed
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.10 level.
∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.05 level,
∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 0.01 level,
e昀fects.
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